Why Don't the Losers Storm the Palace? Institutions and the Problem of Succession

Abstract:

Achieving peaceful transitions of power is a central challenge in autocratic regimes. This paper examines how different institutional approaches to succession shaped the likelihood of conflict in pre-modern monarchies. Succession practices varied widely, but can be characterized by three features: (1) whether the successor was identified before or after the ruler’s death; (2) whether succession followed a fixed rule or a discretionary process; and (3) whether power passed vertically (to a younger generation) or laterally (within the same generation). I argue that fixed rules reduce conflict by coordinating expectations, while vertical succession lowers the risk of violence by filtering for claimants with longer time horizons, lower military capacity, and fewer frustrated expectations. Using original data on over 2,600 monarchs from 800 to 1800 CE, I find that generational direction is the strongest predictor of peaceful transitions. Fixed rules are also associated with reduced conflict, but especially when paired with vertical succession. Systems that combine lateral succession with fixed rules—such as agnatic seniority—perform worse than more flexible or discretionary designs, suggesting that succession direction can condition or even override the effects of selection procedures.